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A New Attempt at 
Defining an Old Maxim 
T here is no better established precept in American criminal jurispru-dence than the prosecution must 
convince the trier offact of the defendant's 
guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." The 
firmness with which this precept under-
girds criminal justice is matched only by 
the determined, varied and ambiguous at-
tempts to define, in objective terms, this 
inherently subjective state of mind. 
Since the genesis of American criminal 
procedure, a significantly higher degree of 
persuasion has been required in criminal 
cases than in their civil counterpart. It was 
not until the late 1700's that this higher 
standard of persuasion was actually termed 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." See C. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 341 (2d ed. 1972). 
Before the phrase "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" was coined, such phrases as "a 
clear impression," "upon clear grounds," 
"rational doubt," and "rational and well 
grounded doubt" were used to describe the 
burden of persuason in criminal cases. See 
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1981). 
Although unanimously adhered to by vir-
tually all United States courts, the reason-
able doubt standard was not established 
conclusively as a requirement of the due 
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments until 1970. The United States 
Supreme Court had previously, in dicta, 
indicated that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard was constitutionally mandated. See, 
e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 174 (1949) (that guilt in a criminal 
case must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt is "to some extent embodied in the 
Constitution"); Davis v. United States, 
160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (reasonable 
doubt standard is implicit in "constitu-
tions ... [that] recognize the fundamental 
principles that are deemed essential for the 
protection oflife and liberty"). 
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided In 
Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), wherein 
the Court stated, "[l]est there remain any 
doubt about the constitutional stature of 
32-The Law Forum/Spring, 1986 
by The Honorable 
Marvin B. Steinberg 
the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly 
hold that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged." Id. at 364. The Court 
enunciated that: 
The reasonable doubt standard plays a 
vital role in the American scheme of 
criminal procedure. It is a prime in-
strument for reducing the risk of con-
victions resting on factual error. The 
standard provides concrete substance 
for the presumption of innocence-
that bedrock 'axiomatic and elemen-
tary' principle whose 'enforcement 
lies at the foundation of the adminis-
tration of our criminal law'. 
Id. at 363 (quoting Cojjin v. United States, 
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that the failure to instruct a jury on 
the necessity of proof of guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt can never be harmless error. 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 
n. 14 (1979). 
In 1980, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that "a trial judge in a criminal 
case, must give an instruction explaining 
'reasonable doubt' if requested by the ac-
cused." Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 
243,412 A.2d 88,93 (1980). It is this "ex-
planation" of reasonable doubt that has 
fostered much confusion for trial judges 
and jurors alike. It is exceedingly difficult 
to create universally understood reasonable 
doubt standards considering the variety of 
meanings individuals give to everyday lan-
guage and experience. 
Prior to 1949, many Maryland trial 
judges felt the meaning of reasonable doubt 
was so difficult to convey that an attempt 
to define or explain "reasonable doubt" 
would further confuse the minds of the ju-
rors; therefore, these judges refused to at-
tempt to give any definition because it may 
have been grounds for reversal. In 1949, 
the court of appeals held that it would not 
be so confusing to the jury so as to consti-
tute error to give a correct explanation of 
"reasonable doubt." See Lambert v. State, 
193 Md. 551, 560-61, 69 A.2d 461, 465 
(1949). The Lambert holding was affirmed 
in Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 412 
A.2d 88 (1980), wherein the court noted: 
The term 'reasonable doubt' is not so 
commonplace, simple, and clear that 
its meaning is self-evident to the jury. 
Even judges, who have 'professional 
expertise' and 'experience,' and who, 
by their 'legal training, traditional ap-
proach to problems, and the very state 
of the art of [their] profession ... learn 
to perceive, distinguish and interpret 
the nuances of the law which are its 
warp and woof,' have difficulty con-
struing the meaning of 'reasonable 
doubt.' Indeed, in a myriad of cases, 
trial judges have committed error by 
incorrectly explaining 'reasonable 
doubt.' Some unskilled and untutored 
lay jurors are at least as likely as some 
judges to misconstrue the meaning of 
'reasonable doubt.' Consequently, a 
correct explanation may well serve the 
useful function of enlightening rather 
than confusing a jury. 
/d. at 242, 412 A.2d at 93 (citations and 
footnotes omitted). 
Conversely, a minority of jurisdictions 
still maintain that any instruction explain-
ing "reasonable doubt" constitutes error. 
See, e.g., People v. Cagle, 41 Ill. 2d 528, 
536,244 N.E.2d 200,204 (1969); Blakely 
v. State, 542 P.2d 857,861 (Wyo. 1975). 
Upon my judicial appointment to the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City and sub-
sequent assignment to hear criminal cases, 
I was faced with the dilemma of being re-
quired to give an instruction explaining 
"reasonable doubt" which I felt served to 
create rather than to remove confusion in 
the minds of jurors. An instruction regard-
ing "reasonable doubt" as provided in D. 
Arronson, Maryland Criminal Jury In-
structions and Commentary § 1.04 (1975), 
or a slight modification thereto, was being 
used by many of my colleagues and was 
suggested for my use. Section 1.04 pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt founded 
upon reason. It is not a fanciful doubt 
or a whimsical or capricious doubt. It 
is such a doubt as would cause a rea-
sonable person to hesitate to act in the 
graver or more important transactions 
oflife. Thus, if the evidence is of such 
a character as to persuade you of the 
truth of the charges against the defen-
dant with the same force that would be 
sufficient to persuade you to act on 
that abiding conviction of truth in the 
graver or more important transactions 
of your own life, you may conclude 
that the state has met its burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and 
to a moral certainty. 
In my opinion, the terminology of this in-
struction did not aid the juror in compre-
hending the "reasonable doubt" standard; 
rather, the terminology made the defini-
tion more obscure by focusing the juror's 
consideration on certain principles with-
out attempting to explain to the juror a 
standard by which these principles could 
be applied. 
Recognizing that Maryland appellate 
courts have approved diverse versions of 
reasonable doubt instructions and have 
held there is no one instruction that must 
be given, see Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 
84, 95, 437 A.2d 654, 659-60 (1981), I 
chose to develop my own reasonable doubt 
instruction. I tried to develop an instruc-
tion that would include basic concepts, 
would aid the jurors in comprehending 
reasonable doubt without adding confu-
sion, and would allow the jurors to relate 
"reasonable doubt" to events familiar to 
them. The following instruction was the 
result: 
With regard to reasonable doubt, it 
can be explained in many ways, and 
I usually like to have something ex-
plained to me by comparing it with 
something else. 
Reasonable doubt refers to the de-
gree to which you are convinced about 
something, and if you think for a min-
ute and think about the decisions that 
you have made in your life, sometimes 
your mind is evenly divided. You 
might call that six of one, half dozen of 
another, evenly divided. 
The State's burden is more than that; 
you have to be convinced beyond that 
of the defendant's guilt. Sometimes 
you think of something and you will 
say to yourself, "Well it is probably so, 
possibly not so, but probably so." The 
State's burden of proof in a criminal 
case goes beyond that, it must be more 
than probably so. 
Sometimes you are absolutely and 
totally convinced of something the 
witness said, "2 + 2 is 4." Absolutely, 
we know that this is true. The State 
does not have to prove its case to that 
kind of absolute certainty, so that 
when we say beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we mean that you must be con-
vinced more than probably, but not 
necessarily absolutely. 
You [can not] have any reasonable 
doubt. You can have some doubt but 
only to the extent anything is possible, 
but you must not have reasonable 
doubt. If you have reasonable doubt, 
you have to find the defendant not 
guilty. 
If you are convinced to such a de-
gree, so that you would on that basis 
make a decision in your own life, an 
important decision based on that state 
of being convinced, then you could 
say that "yes" you are convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt, but if you 
would not make that decision because 
your doubt is reasonable, then you 
would say you are not convinced at 
that point and that you do have rea-
sonable doubt. 
It is only complicated in the explain-
ing. It is not really that complicated 
when you try and relate it to your 
everyday life, and if you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
defendant is guilty, then your verdict 
should be guilty. If you are not so con-
vinced, then your verdict should be 
not guilty. 
The only limit the court of appeals has 
placed on the giving of a reasonable doubt 
instruction is that the instruction must be 
more than a mere statement that reasonable 
doubt is doubt based on reason, Montgom-
ery v. State, 292 Md. 84,95,437 A.2d 654, 
660 (1981). The instruction must focus 
the jurors "attention on the grave impor-
tance of their decision based on the evi-
dence and their commitment to be bound 
by the result." Id. As long as the instruc-
tion is a correct statement of the law, the 
particular phraseology is not important. 
In sum, the inherently subjective nature 
of the "reasonable doubt" standard invari-
ably creates difficulties when one attempts 
to convey its meaning to another. Some 
guidance, however, is necessary. More-
over, the shorter and personally familiar 
the instruction can be to an individual ju-
ror, the greater the guarantee that no per-
son will be deprived oflife or liberty unless 
the jurors are convinced upon their con-
sciences that the evidence before them is 
sufficient proofbeyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which that person is charged. 
Judge Marvin B. Steinberg is a grad-
uate of the University of Baltimore School 
of Law. He is a Judge for the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City and is presently 
a member of the Council for the Mary-
land State Bar Association's Section on 
Judicial Administration. 
Protect your employees, yeur 
company, and yourself from the 
personal suffering and financial 
loss of cancer ... call your local 
unit of the American Cancer 
Society and ask for their free 
pamphlet, "Helping Your 
Employees to Protect Them-
selves Against Cancer." Start 
your company on a policy of 
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